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COMMENTS
THE GUARANTY: A DILEMMA FOR CORPORATE MANAGERS
by J. Christopher Bird
The corporate guaranty' utilized by management as a financing device'
is a valuable tool. Although the main benefit is to the debtor whose obli-
gation is guarantied, the corporate guaranty can be used effectively to
confer benefits upon a guarantying corporation in facilitating the sale of
bond issues for subsidiaries, negotiating a lease of property, and by arrang-
ing lines of credit for a dependent corporation. Guaranties executed for
suppliers, customers, employees or others having a special relationship to
the corporation may produce benefits for the guarantor corporation far
outweighing the risk of loss attendant upon the guaranty.
The utility' of the guaranty is clearest in the increasingly widespread
use of related corporate entities. In the past it was more common for a
business entity to be embodied in one corporation which owned its busi-
ness quarters, purchased the raw materials, manufactured them into the
finished product, and sold them through its own sales office. However,
tax and other advantages have motivated corporate managers' to break up
a manufacturing enterprise into separate corporations, each handling a
distinct function of the entire enterprise. For example, one corporation is
formed to own the real estate and manufacturing equipment and to pur-
chase the raw materials, a second company is created to perform all the
manufacturing processes, and a third is formed as a distributing outlet to
purchase the finished products and resell them.' Often similar functions
in different geographical areas are separately incorporated, each under local
law, to minimize local taxes. Also, related ventures may be separately in-
corporated to insulate their liabilities from one another. Obviously the
financial standings of these "family corporations" are not always equal.
Frequently one corporation seeking credit has very limited financial means,
but another corporation in the group is willing to guarantee the proposed
financial obligations of the weaker company. In Texas, if the relationship
between the two corporations were that of parent and one hundred per
' The term "guaranty" is frequently indistinguishable from the closely related concepts of
"surety" and "accommodation." Compare, e.g., TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.415 (1968),
with id. §§ 3.416, 34.01. Both "guaranty" and "guarantee" are used interchangeably to mean a
promise to answer for the payment of some debt in case of the failure of another person, who, in
the first instance, is liable for such payment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 833 (4th ed. 19i5i).
2Within this Comment the scope of a corporate guaranty is limited to those circumstances in
which a corporation, through the actions of its officers and directors, guaranties the obligations of
persons or entities other than itself.
'The guaranty's necessity has been recognized and corrective legislation called for to solve the
chronic problems concerning the authorization and enforceability of the corporate guaranty. Report
of the Subcommittee on Factor's Liens and Accounts Receivable, 11 Bus. LAW. 59, 69 (1956).
" For the purposes of convenience "corporate managers" will be used in the Comment in lieu of
"corporate officers and directors."
' Another mode of enterprise fracturing exists where several corporations are formed, each
marketing a limited product line and all companies using the same manufacturing and distribution
facilities.
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cent wholly-owned subsidiary, severe legal problems would not exist.' How-
ever, if the relationship between the two companies rests merely on mutual
stockholdings of less than one hundred per cent and the anticipated bene-
fits from the symbiotic arrangement, the validity of the guaranty depends
upon the willingness of the courts to recognize such benefits as justifying
the issuance of the guaranty.
The Texas legislature and courts have been "diligent in protecting
stockholders from dissipation of a corporation's assets by its managers
through improvident guaranties." 7 Similarly the legislature8 and courts"
have been ready to afford utmost protection against potential injury to
any creditor who has relied upon the execution of a guaranty in extend-
ing credit. But the corporate manager has not been shown the same pro-
tection; the dissident shareholder or damaged creditor can seek recourse
against him.
Sound business judgment occasionally calls for the execution of a cor-
porate guaranty" although the particular circumstance may not support
the manager's action as intra vires. While the guaranty is not the most
necessary tool of corporate finance, its recurring unavailability to corporate
managers and lending institutions reportedly has caused the bouleversement
of many proposed business transactions." Unable to use the guaranty de-
vice, the corporate managers are forced to utilize other prevalent tech-
niques of financial aid used between related corporations, such as sub-
leasing, subcontracting, sublending, advance orders for goods, and security
deposits." While these forms of financial aid between businesses create an
immediate liability for the financing corporation, the guaranty creates
only a liability contingent upon the default of the individual or corpora-
tion whose obligation is guarantied. A comprehensive statute is needed to
eliminate the hazards which presently exist in utilizing the guaranty.
Legislative recognition should be given to the sound business motivations
of creditors, primary obligors and corporate guarantors in using the guar-
anty as a financing device.
Until such legislative action, the corporate manager's dilemma is: Should
he utilize the guaranty as a credit device and risk personal liability or
should he pursue alternatives, even though less desirable to the corporation,
and thereby avoid any consequence of personal liability? This Comment
will attempt to examine the situations in which a corporation could be
6 TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1968) grants a corporation the author-
ity to guarantee obligations for its 100% wholly owned and operated subsidiaries.
' Slover, Enforceability of Guaranties Made by Texas Corporations, 10 Sw. L.J. 134, 142 (1956).
8 See text accompanying notes 61-70 infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 92-97 infra.
"Officers of several Dallas banks report that they believe approximately 2% to 5% of their
banks' loan portfolios are secured by corporate guaranties. Depending upon the loan capacity of the
particular bank, these percentages are equivalent to amounts between $2 million and $80 million.
"1 Both bankers and corporate managers are aware that the guaranty can be properly authorized
today in only two situations: (1) where a direct benefit accrues to the guarantor corporation, or
(2) where the parties to the guaranty transaction are a parent corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, or two subsidiaries wholly owned by the same parent.
ii Cf. J. BOGEN, FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 20:37 (4th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as BOGEN]; 1
A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1007-08 (5th ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited
as DEWING]; J. RICE, FRANCHISING PHENOMENON 11 (1969).
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benefited by the use of guaranties, the dilemma of corporate managers
contemplating authorization of a guaranty and appropriate legislation to
empower Texas corporations to act as guarantors.
I. UTILIZING THE CORPORATE GUARANTY
The guaranty's usefulness is limited only by the imagination of corporate
managers. In some situations the benefits conferred on the guarantor re-
sulting from the guaranty are obvious." In other situations the guaranty
effects the desired results, but these results are not easily categorized as
directly beneficial to the corporation. 4
Guaranties Between Parent and Subsidiary Corporations." The use of a
corporate guaranty may be advantageous for a parent corporation in in-
stances where: (a) the success of the parent corporation is largely depend-
ent upon the success of the subsidiary;"' (b) the failure of the subsidiary
would impair the parent's credit standing;' (c) the subsidiary needs the
time and opportunity to develop a credit of its own;" and (d) the added
credit of the parent will materially lower the cost of a commercial loan
to the subsidiary."
The corporate guaranty is utilized in several ways by a parent seeking
to benefit its subsidiary. The parent can guarantee the payment of rentals
to the owner of property leased by the subsidiary. Similarly, the parent
corporation can enable a subsidiary to make needed purchases of equip-
ment and property by guarantying to the seller the subsidiary's install-
ment payments. Bank and commercial financing for the subsidiary is
possible through the lines of credit provided by the parent company's
guaranty.
The purpose of guarantying the subsidiary's bond is to improve the
investment character of the bond issue."° The guarantied bond is one on
"
3 See Squaw Gulch Mining & Milling Co. v. Kollberg, 36 Ariz. 442, 286 P. 822 (1930) (cor-
poration executed guaranty as part payment of the purchase price for property it received); Mc-
Carty v. Nostrand Lumber Co., 232 App. Div. 63, 248 N.Y.S. 606 (1931) (guaranty issued in
exchange for notes and mortgage of another company); North Tex. State Bank v. Crowley-South-
land Comm'n Co., 145 S.W. 1027 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (corporate guaranty was used as partial
purchase price for cattle).
1 See text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
15 See notes 10-11 supra. These bankers point out that the majority of corporate guaranties are
"downstream" guaranties issued by the parent on obligations of the subsidiary. "Upstream" guaran-
ties are feasible when the enterprise fracturing results in the subsidiary appearing financially stronger
than the parent, or when the bank simply wants any additional security.
"See In re John B. Rose Co., 275 F. 416 (2d Cir. 1921); In re Duncan & Goodell Co., 15 F.
Supp. 550 (D. Mass. 1936); General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 248 F. 303 (D.N.J. 1918).
See also 6 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2593 (perm. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited
as FLETCHER]; Slover, supra note 7, at 139.
"Choctaw Lumber Co. v. Atlanta Band Mill, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 701, 77 S.E.2d 333 (1953).
"8See BOGEN 14:26; DEWING 125.
"See E. DONALDSON & J. PFAHL, CORPORATE FINANCE 185 (2d ed. 1963); H. GUTHMANN
& H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 142 (3d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as GuTH-
MANN & DOUGALL].
as Guaranties on bond issues may be direct, as in a guaranty by endorsement upon the bond at
the time of issue, or indirect, as in a special covenant, lease or operating agreement with the debtor
corporation. A direct guaranty usually arises at the time of issue in the case of a parent company
desiring to aid the sale of bonds by its subsidiary when the credit of the parent permits the sub-
sidiary to issue lower interest bonds. Such a guaranty assures the bond purchaser that the parent
[Vol. 2 3
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which the payment of interest or principal, or usually both, are guarantied
by the parent." A lease of a subsidiary's property by the parent can in-
clude consideration provisions whereby the parent guaranties to pay to the
subsidiary a certain sum of money each year for a definite period of time."
The sum closely approximates amounts owed by the subsidiary on bond
obligations. A guaranty of dividends' on the preferred stock of a sub-
sidiary by a parent can be utilized to provide capital for a subsidiary be-
fore the smaller company has had the time and opportunity to develop
a reputation or credit rating of its own.' Many times the only means by
which a subsidiary can secure a loan is by having its parent guarantee to
the creditor that the subsidiary will maintain a prescribed working capital.'
Guaranties for Common-Control Companies." Common-control compa-
nies utilize the guaranty to supplement the credit of one another." In-
vestors frequently consider the purchase of a corporation's securities where
the investment is attractive only because of the availability of recourse
against one or more corporations under common control.' The most ob-
vious of these situations is represented where two commonly controlled
subsidiaries of the same parent are obligors jointly and severally on issues
of long-term notes and bonds. Since it is liable for the full amount of
the obligation, each subsidiary then guaranties repayment of any portion
of the financing proceeds which it did not receive.'
company will not cast the subsidiary adrift even though the latter's business proves unprofitable.
The parent benefits by providing credit to the subsidiary, and lower bond interest charges mean
greater net profits to be passed along as dividends upon the common stock that is owned by the
parent. See BOGEN 14:26, 14:27; DEwING 127, 220, 221; E. DONALDSON & J. PFAHL, supra note
19, at 185; GUTHMANN & DOUGALL 142, 143.
21 See DEWING 127. Dewing explains that the guaranty may take various forms, of which two
are more common: (1) guaranty of both principal and interest, and (2) guaranty of only a portion
of principal and of interest. Id. at 221 n.rr.
22 See DEWING 220.
2 Guarantied stocks came into existence as a by-product of leases and consolidations among
railroads and other rolling stock concerns. See DEWING 125-26. One corporation may lease property
of another company by providing rental in the form of a guarantied dividend on the stock of the
lessor corporation. See GUTHMANN & DOUGALL 95. Similarly, consideration by a larger corporation
for securing the operating control of smaller companies may be in the form of an agreement where-
by specified dividends on the stock of the smaller companies were guarantied by the larger cor-
poration. See DEWING 126.
24 See DEWING 126. The guaranty contract runs between the guarantor and the equity security
holder. In no way can the stock issuer be forced to meet the payment of dividends if the guaranty
is repudiated by the guarantor or if the guaranty cannot be enforced. Id. at 127.
2' See notes 10, 11, 15 supra. The bankers report that this arrangement is similar to those loan
contracts conditioning the payments of any dividends upon a prescribed level or ratio of net assets
to liabilities.
2 Common-control companies are also referred to as "sister corporations" or "affiliated cor-
porations." See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06B(4) (Supp. 1968). The guaranties
between these corporations are frequently referred to as "cross-stream" guaranties.
2 See Stromberg-Carlson Tel. Mfg. Co. v. George C. Beckwith Co., 193 Minn. 255, 258 N.W.
314 (1935); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Carmen Homes, Inc., 221 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1959); Rusch &
Co. v. Syndicate First Corp., 155 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1956).
28 See BOGEN 14:27; GUTHMANN & DOUGALL 210; Everdell & Longstreth, Some Special Prob-
lems Raised by Debt Financing of Corporations Under Common Control, 17 Bus. LAW. 500, 501-03(1962).2See BOGEN 14:27; GUTHMANN & DOUGALL 210; Everdell & Longstreth, sujsra note 28, at
501-03.
" If one of two joint and several obligors receives one-third of the proceeds of the sale of se-
curities and the other receives two-thirds, then in legal theory the first is a guarantor for the pay-
ment of two-thirds and the second is a guarantor for the payment of one-third. If the proceeds are
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Guaranties for Customers: Increasing Sales. A corporation may attempt
to increase its sales by guarantying the contracts of its customers with
third parties. By stabilizing the business of its customers, a guarantor cor-
poration can thereby stimulate its own business."' The corporate guaranty
as a credit device is useful in allowing the corporation to: (a) assist its
customers (usually retail dealers) by guarantying their rent to lessors;3
(b) guarantee a dealer's contract with a third person in which the guar-
antor corporation intends to supply the merchandise;' and (c) assist a
lessee of corporation property to remain a going concern by guarantying
its obligations."
Guaranties To Insure Component Supplies and Services. A corporation
needing raw materials, components or other products for assembly and
finishing can utilize a guaranty to enable the vendor manufacturer to
furnish the goods. By guarantying the future purchase' or existing obliga-
tions " of the manufacturer, the guarantor enables the supplier to produce
goods to be manufactured for the guarantor corporation's account. In a
similar manner, a corporation can utilize the guaranty to benefit a com-
pany which can provide needed services for the guarantor.
Guaranties For Employees or Franchisees. If a corporation considers the
to go entirely to one of the two corporations, the other is acting as a mere accommodation guarantor
for the other. If the proceeds are to be divided equally between the two corporations and there
is no security involved, it is at least arguable that each guaranty given is supported by the guaranty
received and that the benefit to each corporation is mutual and equivalent.
31 See Choctaw Lumber Co. v. Atlanta Band Mill, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 701, 77 S.E.2d 333 (1953).
Guaranties of this type were declared ultra vires in Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Crosland-Cullen
Co., 133 F. Supp. 473 (W.D.N.C. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 234 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1956);
W.C. Bowman Lumber Co. v. Pierson, 110 Tex. 543, 221 S.W. 930 (1920); North Side Ry. v.
Worthington, 88 Tex. 562, 30 S.W. 1055 (1895). See also Slover, supra note 7, at 141.
" Miller v. Northern Brewing Co., 242 F. 164 (D. Ore. 1917); Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt
Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141, 162 N.W. 1082 (1917); Hall v. Pauser, 128 N.J.L. 211, 24 A.2d
575 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Koehler & Co. v. Reinheimer, 26 App. Div. 1, 49 N.Y.S. 755 (1898); Chester
Airport, Inc. v. Aeroflex Corp., 37 Misc. 2d 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1962), modified,
18 App. Div. 2d 998, 238 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1963); In re German Jewish Children's Aid, 151 Misc.
834, 272 N.Y.S. 540 (1934); Depot Realty Syndicate v. Enterprise Brewing Co., 87 Ore. 560,
170 P. 294, aff'd on rehearing, 171 P. 223 (Ore. 1918); Mercy v. A.I. Hall & Son, 177 Wash.
338, 31 P.2d 1009 (1934); Annot., 11 A.L.R. 554 (1921). A franchisee or dealer today can also
take advantage of the Federal Lease Guarantee Program, explained in PRACTICING LAW INsTiTUTE,
BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FRANCHISE 166-71 (1968).
saHenderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gregory, 16 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1926); In re S.P. Smith
Lumber Co., 132 F. 620 (C.C.N.D. Tex. 1904); Woods Lumber Co. v. Moore, 183 Cal. 497, 191
P. 905 (1920); Simpson v. Bergmann, 125 Cal. App. 1, 13 P.2d 531 (1932); Central Lumber Co.
v. Kelter, 201 Ill. 503, 66 N.E. 543 (1903); Hoosier Brick Co. v. Floyd County Bank, 64 Ind.
App. 445, 116 N.E. 87 (1917); Wittmer Lumber Co. v. Rice, 23 Ind. App. 586, 55 N.E. 868
(1900); Edwards v. International Pavement Co., 227 Mass. 206, 116 N.E. 266 (1917) (licensor
guarantying obligations of licensee); W.C. Bowman Lumber Co. v. Pierson, 110 Tex. 543, 221
S.W. 930 (1920); Interior Woodwork Co. v. Prasser, 108 Wis. 557, 84 N.W. 833 (1901).
34B-F Bldg. Corp. v. Coleman, 284 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1960); Woods Lumber Co. v. Moore, 183
Cal. 497, 141 P. 905 (1920); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Same, 36 Cal. App. 818, 173 P. 406 (1918);
Armour & Co. v. R. Rosenberg & Sons, 36 Cal. App. 773, 173 P. 404 (1918); May Tire & Serv.,
Inc. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 240 Wis. 260, 3 N.W.2d 347 (1942).
" Whitehead v. American Lamp & Brass Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 581, 62 A. 554 (Ch. 1905); Norfolk
Mattress Co. v. Royal Mfg. Co., 160 Va. 623, 169 S.E. 586 (1933).
'Knapp v. Tidewater Coal Co., 85 Conn. 147, 81 A. 1063 (1912); Bacon v. Montauk Brewing
Co., 130 App. Div. 737, 115 N.Y.S. 617 (1909); A.M. Castle & Co. v. Public Serv. Underwriters,
198 Wash. 576, 89 P.2d 506 (1939).
s'While no cases have been found specifically dealing with services, the use of a guaranty in
his manner ;an be analo;ized to its use for securing supplies. See cases cited notes 35, 36 supra.
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services of an employee valuable, it may execute a guaranty of his per-
sonal obligations for the purpose of retaining him. This added confidence
in the corporate employee would bolster the corporation's opportunity to
function efficiently and allow the company to pursue prospective customers
initially solicited by the employee." A similar application of the guaranty
can be found in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. The franchisor
corporation may guarantee the debt obligations of a franchisee to
strengthen or increase the growth of the franchise operation. To furnish
financial assistance when needed by the franchisee has been considered an
"obvious responsibility of the franchisor."" However, to avoid incurring
an immediate liability themselves, some franchisors will aid a franchisee
in obtaining credit by guarantying the franchisee's debt obligations.'0
II. THE CORPORATE MANAGER'S DILEMMA
Prior to the adoption of the Texas Business Corporation Act in 1955,
Texas corporations were limited to the pursuit of a single purpose 1 and
all acts of a corporation were required to be directed toward the effectua-
tion of that purpose.' The impositions of such restrictions on corporate
actions fostered strict judicial application of the ultra vires doctrine.'
Courts consistently held that it was not generally necessary in the proper
conduct of a business that a corporation lend its credit to another.'
However, two exceptions to this general rule developed:' (1) a guaranty
could be authorized and enforced because the direct benefits to the cor-
poration anticipated from the guaranty brought it within the implied
38 M. Burg & Sons v. Twin City Four Wheel Drive Co., 140 Minn. 101, 167 N.W. 300 (1918);
L.G. Balfour Co. v. Gossett, 131 Tex. 348, 115 S.W.2d 594 (1938); Al & Lloyd Parker, Inc. v.
Cameron County Lumber Co., 56 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), aff'd, 122 Tex. 487, 62
S.W.2d 63 (1933); see Slover, supra note 7, at 141-42.
39 C. VAUGHN, FRANCHISING TODAY 59 (1969).40 J. RICE, supra note 12, at 11.
4'TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302 (repealed by Tex. Laws 1961, ch. 229, § 1, ch. 205,
2; Tex. Laws 1955, ch. 64, art. 9.16).
'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1349 (1962). See also Baker, The Proposed Texas Business
Corporation Act-Two Important Developments, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 843 (1952).
43 Ramsey v. Tod, 95 Tex. 614, 69 S.W. 133 (1902), held that a corporation is limited to the
pursuit of only one enumerated statutory purpose. Thus, a corporation could be incorporated under
only one subdivision of the purpose article and could not combine two purposes set out in the
same subdivision unless one was necessary or incidental to the other. In soime situations the cor-
poration's purpose did not quite correspond to an enumerated statutory purpose. Thus, recourse to
the courts was necessary to determine whether the corporate purpose was valid. Similarly, the scope
of the corporation's powers was gauged by the courts. The judicial resolution took one of two forms:
(1) the particular power was properly implied from the charter power as limited by the statute,
or (2) the particular power was actually set out in a separately enumerated statutory provision,
and was, therefore, ultra vires. See Baker, supra note 42, at 846-47.
4 4 North Side Ry. v. Worthington, 88 Tex. 562, 30 S.W. 1055 (1895). See also Rio Refrigeration
Co. v. Thermal Supply of Harlingen, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Texas Util.
Co. v. Storey, 85 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Brand v. Eastland County Lumber Co., 77
S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. v. Grand Rapids Store Equip.
Corp., 57 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Al & Lloyd Parker, Inc. v. Cameron County Lumber
Co., 56 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), aff'd, 122 Tex. 487, 62 S.W.2d 63 (1933); First State
Bank v. Sanford, 255 S.W. 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Ingram v. Texas Christian Univ., 196 S.W.
608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), error ref.; Carla Land & Irrigation Co. v. Asherton, 164 S.W. 1066
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Forty-Acre Spring Live Stock Co. v. West Tex. Bank & Trust Co., 111
S.W. 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), error ref.; Deaton Grocery Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
105 S.W. 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), error ref.; South Tex. Nat'l Bank v. LaGrange Oil Mill Co.,
40 S.W. 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897), error ref.
' See cases cited note 44 supra. See also Slover, supra note 7, at 134.
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powers of the corporation," or (2) a guaranty was enforceable because
the corporation was estopped to assert ultra vires since benefits to the
corporation were actually received.
In application of the first exception, authorization of the guaranty was
deemed intra vires not by the corporate manager's characterization and
anticipation of a "direct benefit" from the guaranty, but rather by judicial
hindsight of the results of the guaranty transaction." North Side Railway
v. Worthington4' provided the "direct benefit" guideline upon which later
decisions construed'0 the authorization and enforceability of corporate
guaranties. Noting that it was not easy to lay down a rule by which to
determine whether or not a guarantor derived "direct benefit" from the
guaranty transaction, the court cited a "well-known text writer" as hav-
ing announced a rule not only reasonable but also in accord with the
great weight of authority:
Whatever be a company's legitimate business, the company may foster it
by all the usual means. But it may not go beyond this; it may not, under
the pretext of fostering, entangle itself in proceedings with which it has no
legitimate concern. In the next place, the courts have, however, determined
that such means shall be direct, not indirect,-i.e. that a company shall not
enter into engagements, as the rendering of assistance to other undertakings,
from which it anticipates a benefit to itself, not immediately, but mediately
by reaction, as it were, from the success of the operations thus encouraged;
all such proceedings inevitably tending to breaches of duty on part of the
directors, to abandonment of its peculiar objects on part of the corporation.
Green's Brice, Ultra Vires, 88. In short, if the means be such as are usually
resorted to, and a direct method of accomplishing the purpose of the incor-
poration, they are within its powers. If they be unusual, and tend in an
indirect manner only to promote its interests, they are held to be ultra vires."
The Texas Business Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as the
TBCA) and the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act contained
several provisions bearing on the corporate guaranty question. These pro-
visions afford considerable protection for shareholders and creditors re-
lying on a guaranty and place the corporate managers in a serious dilemma
regarding its authorization.
TBCA: Purpose Clauses. The TBCA introduced the multi-purpose ap-
proach by permitting a corporation to be organized for any lawful pur-
pose, provided that the purpose was fully stated in the articles of incor-
poration." The language of article 2.01A would seem to permit the cor-
porate draftsman to include the guaranty function as one of the corpora-
4' See, e.g., North Tex. State Bank v. Crowley-Southland Comm'n Co., 145 S.W. 1027 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912) (corporate guaranty was used as partial purchase price for cattle).
4 7 See, e.g., Gaston & Ayres v. J.I. Campbell Co., 130 S.W. 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), rev'd,
104 Tex. 576, 140 S.W. 770, modified, 104 Tex. 585, 141 S.W. 515 (1911).
" But generally a court does not substitute its judgment for that of a corporate board of direc-
tors. See Galler v. Galler, 95 Ill. App. 340, 238 N.E.2d 274 (1968); Bates v. Texas Elec. Ry., 220
S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
4988 Tex. 562, 30 S.W. 1055 (1895).
so See cases cited note 44 supra.
5130 S.W. at 1056.
22 TEx. Bus. Coas". ACT ANN. art. 2.01A (1956).
[Vol. 23
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tion's stated purposes, but the Secretary of State will not issue a charter
if a guaranty purpose is explicitly stated in the articles of incorporation.'
Some observers argue that even if the courts were still to adhere to the
"direct benefit" test, the broadened scope of permitted purposes would
make it far more likely that a guaranty would directly benefit one or
more of the purposes for which a particular corporation was organized."
Others, however, conclude that listing page after page of purpose clauses
inherently promotes restrictions through inferred exclusions, and there-
fore prefer a short purpose clause upon which hosts of direct benefits may
be founded.5 Thus, the purpose clause provisions of the TBCA provide no
relief for the managers of a business who remain in the same precarious
position as before TBCA enactment when contemplating the authorization
of a corporate guaranty.
TBCA: Powers. The right of a corporation to guarantee indebtedness
more properly should be analyzed in terms of the corporation's powers
than in terms of its corporate purposes. Article 2.02A provides that each
corporation organized under the Act shall have enumerated powers, with-
out requiring that these powers be set out in the articles of incorporation."e
Some of the listed statutory powers, such as the power to "deal in and with
. . . obligations of other . . . corporations,"57 and the power to "make
contracts and incur liabilities' ' "s are arguably very close to the power to
guarantee. Further, subsection 19 of article 2.02A confers all powers,
whether listed or not, which are "necessary or appropriate" to carry out
the purposes for which the corporation is organized." However, determi-
nation by the courts of the necessity or appropriateness of a corporate
guaranty would be not only by resort to the "direct benefit" test, but also
by consideration of the Attorney General's opinion" on this matter. Pro-
visions of the TBCA providing for corporate powers offer no sure solu-
tion to the corporate manager's dilemma.
TBCA: Ultra Vires. Article 2.04 of the TBCA purports "to limit ma-
terially, not abolish, the doctrine of ultra vires."' Section A does away
with the concept that a corporate act is invalid for want of capacity by
the corporation to perform it.62 This Texas provision goes further in
'a TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. WW-440 (1958) concluded that a corporation, whose articles of
incorporation contain a purpose clause concerning the execution of guaranties, would be authorized
to engage in the business of insurance-a business for which a corporation may not be organized
under the TBCA.
54 See, e.g., Pearce, Corporate Guaranties-A Rationale for Enforceability, Vol. 5, No. 2 BUL-
LETIN OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BusINEss LAW 3 (Tex. State Bar, Jan.
1967).
' See, e.g., Lee & Pelletier, Drafting the Articles of Incorporations-Some Comments and Sug-
gestions, Vol. 7, No. 3 BULLETIN OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BusINESs LAW
2 (Tex. State Bar, Jan. 1969).
5
"TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02A (1956).5 7
Id. art. 2.02A(7).
5 81d. art. 2.02A(9); cf. text accompanying note 100 infra.
"9Id. art. 2.02A(19).
"°See note 53 subsra.
" Comment of Bar Committee, 3A TEx. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. 40 (1956).
62 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.04A (1965). Early attempts to classify ultra vires cases
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abrogating the defense of ultra vires than does its counterpart in the Model
Business Corporation Act. Whereas the latter uses "lack of capacity"
throughout to indicate ultra vires transactions, the TBCA characterizes
acts beyond the corporate purposes as "wanting authority."' Section B pro-
vides that no act or conveyance is invalid because such act is beyond the
scope of the purpose (s) of the corporation expressed in the articles of
incorporation." Corporate acts likewise may not be held invalid by rea-
son of a limitation expressed in the articles on the authority of corporate
officers and directors to exercise any statutory power of the corporation.""
However, section B sets forth three instances in which ultra vires may
be asserted to support a cause of action:" (1) in a proceeding by a share-
holder against the corporation to enjoin the commission of an act or trans-
fer of property by or to the corporation;" (2) in a proceeding by the
corporation, directly or derivatively, against incumbent or former officers
or directors for exceeding their authority; and (3) in a proceeding by
the Attorney General to dissolve the corporation, to enjoin the corporation
from transacting unauthorized business, or to divest the corporation of
real property acquired or held contrary to law.
The broad terms of the provisions of article 2.04B (1) authorize share-
holder intervention in a suit against the corporation. Therefore, if a cor-
poration is involved in a suit on a guaranty that it has issued, a shareholder
could intervene in the suit and seek to have the performance of the
guaranty enjoined. In resolving this issue, the courts will undoubtedly
utilize the tests formulated in cases decided prior to the adoption of the
TBCA; thus, the old case law of "direct benefit" qualification may retain
its vitality." If the shareholder is successful, the court may still allow
recovery against the corporation to the recipient of the guaranty for
actual damages" sustained as a result of reliance on the guaranty. The
led to the distinction between corporate capacity and corporate authority. If a corporation lacked
the capacity to act as a guarantor, any contract of guaranty which it entered was void; doctrines
of direct benefit or estoppel were of no effect. 6 FLETCHER § 2598. If, on the other hand, a cor-
poration having the capacity to act as guarantor exceeded its authority in so acting, the contract
was only voidable; doctrines of benefit or estoppel could cut off the defense of ultra vires. Id. at
55 2598-2599.
63 The statutory language and the comments of the bar committee draftsmen indicate that the
corporation should be viewed as a collection of individuals for whom the articles serve as a limiting
source of authority for the corporate managers. But since the "agency" approach for the solution
of ultra vires transactions is not clearly established, the corporate managers' resort to shareholder
ratification for the execution of a guaranty does not eliminate their dilemma. See text accompany-
ing notes 74-75 infra.
"TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.04B (1956).
65 id.
65 Id. It is questionable whether a trustee in bankruptcy of the guarantor corporation could assert
ultra vires.
"'The court may enjoin or set aside performance of the (authorized) contract only if all the
parties to the contract are made parties to the action and only if the court deems it equitable.
Compare Intercontinental Corp. v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.,
with remarks made in Brimble, Ultra Vires Under the Texas Business Corporation Act, 40 TEXAS
L. REV. 677, 691, 696 (1962).
68 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
6"e[Blut anticipated profits to be derived from the performance of the contract shall not be




corporation then has a cause of action against the corporate managers for
indemnification."e
Article 2.04B (2) similarly spotlights the potential liability of corporate
managers by providing for corporate suits against them to recover losses
suffered as a result of actions exceeding their authority. A determination of
exceeded authority in executing a guaranty is hinged upon the corpora-
tion's implied and incidental powers' and ultimately turns upon the litmus
reaction in the "direct benefit" medium."2 Thus again, a manager who
issues an "unauthorizable" corporate guaranty may be personally liable for
any resulting losses.7
One avenue of escape may exist for corporate managers. They can sub-
stantially decrease the possibility of article 2.04B(1) and (2) actions by
seeking shareholder ratification of a proposed guaranty. While formal
shareholder ratification is not required, 4 the affirmation by all shareholders
is, since a single shareholder can initiate article 2.04B(1) or (2) pro-
ceedings."2
Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act. In 1961 the Texas legislature
attempted to tidy up the remnants of the general corporation statutes
still having validity after enactment of the TBCA 6 They enacted the
Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act," and, in separate enactments,
repealed most of the old statutes duplicating or conflicting with the
TBCA.7h Articles 134979 and 1351 s0 were not repealed, and the deliberate
omission of these articles from the repealing statute emphasizes their con-
tinuing vitality."' Article 1349 s3 provides that no corporation shall em-
ploy or use its stock, means, assets or other property, directly or indirectly
for any purpose whatever other than to accomplish the legitimate business
7 0 Id. art. 2.04B(2),71 Id. art. 2.02A(19).
72 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
73TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.04B(2) (1956).
74 E.g., permitting the corporate managers repeatedly to authorize and execute guaranties over
a long period of time would be adequate evidence of shareholder ratification. See Petroleum Anchor
Equip., Inc. v. Tyra, 419 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1967); I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 144
(1942). In a publicly held corporation, however, this argument would carry little weight.
" Robinson v. Bradley, 141 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). See Lebowitz, Director Mis-
conduct and Shareholder Ratification in Texas, 6 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1953). Should a shareholder
consenting to the guaranty subsequently sell his stock, his purchaser might seek an injunction against
enforcement of the guaranty. If the purchaser knew of the selling shareholder's consent, he would
be estopped to complain. 7 FLETCHER S 3445. Even without such notice the purchaser may be
estopped. Id. at § 3456. Moreover, usually a shareholder may only complain of corporate wrongs
which occurred after he acquired stock in the corporation. Although the concept of a "continuing
wrong" permits anyone becoming a shareholder after the wrong complained of had commenced
to sue for its discontinuance, a guaranty contract would probably not fit within this concept even
in the case where the corporation was called upon to fulfill its obligations as guarantor after con-
senting shareholders had transferred their stock to outside purchasers. See Henis v. Compania Agrico-
la de Guatemala, 116 F. Supp. 223, 229 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1954).
" See Amsler, Proposed Corporation Law Revisions, 23 TEX. B.J. 709 (1960).
" TEx. REV. Csv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1302-1.01 to -6.26 (1962).78 Tex. Laws 1961, ch. 205, § 2, at 408; Tex. Laws 1961, ch. 229, § 1, at 458.
7' TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1349 (1962).
80 1d. art. 1351.
" The repeal of article 1348 in 1963 adds emphasis to the continuing validity of articles 1349
and 1351. Tex. Laws 1963, ch. 469, § 1, at 1184.8 2 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1349 (1962).
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of the corporation's creation or those purposes permitted by law." These
general prohibitions on activity beyond the corporate purposes and powers
do not render such activity illegal, but rather ultra vires and voidable."4
Article 1351,85 on the other hand, makes a violation of any provision of
article 1349 grounds for forfeiture of the corporation charter, upon proof
of such violation. The statute does mitigate the harshness of forfeiture if
the corporation within one year of the violation disavows the wrong and
permanently dismisses from its service all persons directly or indirectly
connected with such violation. 6 Although Attorney General action seeking
the forfeiture of a corporation charter because of the execution of a cor-
porate guaranty seems inconceivable, 7 the consequence to the corporate
manager for utilizing a corporate guaranty may be either no charter with
which to continue the business or dismissal from employment or director-
ship.
Article 1302-2.06 (B) of the Miscellaneous Act" expressly provides for
upstream, downstream and cross-stream guaranties among parent corpora-
tions and one hundred per cent wholly-owned subsidiaries.8" This provision
most likely would be argued as limiting the authority for corporate guar-
anties to the defined situations, 0 and emphasizing that corporate managers
cannot authorize an ultra vires guaranty without taking the risk that the
guaranty may not meet the rigid "direct benefit" requirements.
TBCA: The Guaranty Cases. Since adoption of the TBCA in 1955 the
83 Article 1349 has been recognized by the Texas courts as merely declaratory of the common
law. See Cooper Petroleum Co. v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1969); State v. San Antonio Pub. Serv. Co., 69
S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1934), opinion adopted; Railway Co. v. Gentry, 69 Tex. 632, 8
S.W. 98 (1888). Since TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.04 (1956) deals much more explicitly
with ultra vires, retention of art. 1349 can only serve to confuse the role of art. 2.04.
4 English v. Landa Motor Lines, 166 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), error ref.; Hollis
Cotton Oil, Light & Ice Co. v. Marrs & Lake, 207 S.W. 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), error ref.
83TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1351 (1962).
85Id. The only logical motive in retaining art. 1351 is to provide a means for forfeiture for
violating art. 1359. But see note 83 spra.
87 Usually the state will not interfere unless the guaranty transaction affects a vital public in-
terest. See Thomas v. E.G. Curtis Sons, 7 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Mich. 1934); Perkins v. Trinity Realty
Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 723, 61 A. 1135, aff'd on rehearing, 71 N.J. Eq. 304, 71 A. 1135 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1906).
88 See Vol. 7, No. 1 BULLETIN OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINEss LAW
2 (Tex. State Bar, Sept. 1968). The Committee on Revision of Corporation Law drafted a bill for
the 1967 Texas legislature to amend TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06 (Supp. 1968) so
as to reduce from 100% to 50o% the minimum stock ownership required to support corporate
guaranties. Id. The legislative liaison Committee of the Texas State Bar entertained doubt as to the
constitutionality of the bill in view of TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 6, and the bill was withdrawn
pending further study. TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 6 provides that "No corporation shall issue stock
or bonds except for money paid, labor done or property actually received, and all fictitious increase
of stock or indebtedness shall be void." If this constitutional provision has any bearing on the
guaranty's employment, and it is suspected that it does not, the constitutionality must rest on the
scope and interpretation of "fictitious increase of . . . indebtedness." If the judgment of the board
of directors as to the value of consideration received for shares is conclusive, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.16C (1956), why shouldn't the same statutory treatment be constitutional regarding
authorization and expectations of the corporate guaranty?
81 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06 (Supp. 1968).
9 But see id. art. 1302-2.06B(6): "Nothing in this section B is intended or shall be construed
to limit or deny to any corporation . . . the right or power to do . . . any action which it is
• . . empowered or authorized to do . . . under any other laws of the State of Texas now in
force ....
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question of corporate guaranties has arisen in two Texas cases." In Empire
Steel Corp. v. Omni Steel Corp." the court held that TBCA article 2.04
prohibits corporate assertion of the defense of ultra vires in a suit brought
by a non-shareholder to enforce a corporate guaranty executed by Empire.
The direct benefit test was not applied to determine the validity of Em-
pire's guaranty; rather, Empire's guaranty was enforced because the TBCA
inhibits presentation of the defense of ultra vires.9 The Empire case left no
clue concerning whether the direct benefit test would be utilized in a suit
to challenge the authorization, rather than the enforceability, of the cor-
porate guaranty. In Cooper Petroleum Co. v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co. 4
the contention was made that Cooper's letter of guaranty was illegal,
void and unenforceable. The court held that although the guaranty con-
tract violated the terms of articles 1349w and 1302-2.06,9' the guaranty
was not void but ultra vires. Because ultra vires, TBCA article 2.04B
operated to make the guaranty enforceable. As in the Empire decision,
Cooper provides no touchstone regarding the guaranty's authorization by
a corporate manager. Empire and Cooper illustrate the effect that the
TBCA has had upon the status of corporate guaranties. The recipient of a
corporate guaranty is accorded maximum protection" against damages
incurred as a result of reliance on the guaranty, while the corporate man-
ager stands on tenuous ground in calculating the feasibility of a corporate
guaranty and his personal risk.
III. THE DESIRABLILITY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The utility of the guaranty has been demonstrated and the dilemma of
corporate managers contemplating the guaranty is evident. If the officers
and directors of a corporation are acting lawfully in transacting its busi-
ness, they must necessarily have a right to perform all the usual commercial
acts which the conduct of the business may demand. An examination of
the statutory forms of a corporation's guaranty power in other jurisdictions
will underscore the desirability of legislative action in Texas. Only eight
states"8 appear to have no statutes relating to the corporate guaranty. The
91Despite the date of decision in Rio Refrigeration Co. v. Thermal Supply, 368 S.W.2d 128
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963), the TBCA did not apply to Rio Refrigeration Co. because it had been
incorporated prior to the adoption of the TBCA. The civil appeals court held that Rio Refrigera-
tion's guaranty as consideration for another company's accounts payable was of direct and material
benefit to Rio and thus the guaranty was within the implied powers of the corporation.
92378 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), error ref. n.r.e. (corporation had adopted TBCA
prior to executing guaranty of its subsidiary's obligation to pay fifty per cent of losses, if any, up
to $50,000 resulting from a joint venture; guarantor corporation could not avoid enforcement of
the guaranty by claiming it was an ultra vires transaction). See, Note, Corporations-Ultra Vires-
Texas Corporation May Not Assert Ultra Vires Defense in a Suit by a Nonshareholder To Compel
Performance of a Corporate Guaranty, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 792 (1965).
93 378 S.W.2d at 910.
94423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1969).
95 See notes 79-83 supra.
" See notes 88-89 supra.
" Subject to the situation arising in Intercontinental Corp. v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
"8 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Illinoi, Kentucky, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Vermont.
1969]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
remaining forty-two states have statutes which vary the scope, purpose
and manner in which the corporate managers can utilize the guaranty.
Model Business Corporation Act. The present Model Business Corpora-
tion Act (hereinafter referred to as MBCA), upon which the TBCA is
based, specifically gives corporations the broad power to guarantee. The
guaranty provision, "to make contracts and guarantees," 9 currently found
in section 4(h) of the Model Act, was not added to the MBCA until
1957, two years after the adoption of the TBCA. But TBCA article
2.02A(9) is identical with section 4(h) of the MBCA as it existed in
1955, thus negating any deliberate legislative omission of the guaranty
power. Further, as the draftsmen of the MBCA point out in their com-
ments to section 4 (h): "The addition of the word 'guarantees' to section
4(h) of the Model Act in 1957 merely makes expressed a power already
possessed both at common law and under the general language of section
4 (h). , ,100
Express Grants of Extensive Guaranty Powers."0 ' In twenty-three states
the statutory grant of power to execute corporate guaranties is apparently
extremely broad. Hawaii,"2 Indiana,"s Iowa, 4 Maryland,"a Mississippi, °H
Missouri, 07 Montana," New Mexico,' Oregon," ° Utah,"' Washington," '
s9" Each corporation shall have power: . . . (h) to make contracts and guarantees and incur
liabilities, borrow money at such rates of interest as the corporation may determine, issue its notes,
bonds and other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage or pledge of all or any
of its property, franchises and income." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 4(h) (1960).
1"9Id. § 4(h) (1960). Whether the drafters were entirely correct in assuming that the common
law afforded corporations the guaranty power is questionable. See, e.g., text accompanying notes
44, 51 sukra.
I An attempt is made here to classify forty-two states within four categories on the basis of
bald statutory language. The classification headings are not designed to serve as conclusive observa-
tions of particular state legislation. For example, the MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 4(h) (1960)
provision apparently connotes an express grant of an extensive guaranty power; but a state such as
Iowa, although adopting the MBCA provision, is unsure of the continuing vitality of the "direct
benefit" theory. See note 104 infra.
102 HAWAII REv. LAWS § 416-26(9) (1968).
103 IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-202 (b) (5) (Supp. 1969); See Deer & Burns, The 1967 Amendments
to the Indiana General Corporation Act, 43 IND. L.J. 14, 24 (1967).
1°4IowA CODE § 496A.4(8) (1962) includes "and to guarantee the obligations of other per-
sons." Comments succeeding the statute include:
While Section 4(h) of the Model Act gives corporations power to make guaranties,
the committee had in mind that a corporation might at some time for its own
benefit wish to guarantee the obligations of its employees or customers, for example
.... Accordingly, the committee added to Section 469A.4(8) the specific power to
guarantee the obligations of other persons, intending thereby to broaden corporate
powers in this respect. The committee felt the Iowa Business Corporation Act thereby
indicates a public policy that corporate powers as to the making of guaranties shall
be broader than they were under the old law, but of course many details are not
covered. There is, for example, no statement of what degree of benefit, if any, the
corporation must be shown to receive if the contract of guaranty is to be valid.
"SMD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 9(a)(5) (Supp. 1969).
10 MIss. CODE ANN. § 5309-04(h) (Supp. 1968).
107Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.385(7) (1966). The comments succeeding the statute state that the
guaranty amendment allowed corporations to guarantee the obligations of other corporations, thus
permitting financial aid to affiliated or subsidiary corporations or others with whom it is doing
business.
108 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2004 (1967).
109N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-24-4(h) (Supp. 1969).
"OORE. REV. STAT. 5 57.030(8) (1968).
.. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-10-4(h) (1962).
"'2WAsH. REV. CODE S 23A.08.020(9) (Supp. 1968).
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Wisconsin,"' and Wyoming " 4 have adopted the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act provision empowering the corporation "to make contracts and
guarantees."" Connecticut,"' Delaware," Georgia, " ' New Hampshire,"9
Pennsylvania, 0 South Carolina,"' and Tennessee' have language in their
corporation statutes comparable to the MBCA's broad grant. Idaho"2 and
Louisiana'" provide a corporation the power of guaranty on the obligations
of a corporation, partnership, association, individual or government.
Less Extensive Grants of Power. Oklahoma" and Virginia1 . extend the
Idaho-Louisiana-type guaranty power to corporations, with the exception
of the express provision authorizing the guaranty of governmental obli-
gations. The Virginia statute adds the proviso that the corporate guaranty
extends to the obligations of "any corporation organized for any pur-
pose.""..7 Maine provides for the extension of corporate guaranties to the
obligations of another corporation, firm or individual." Florida'' and
Nevada' 0 both restrict the corporate guaranty's use to the obligations of
other respective intrastate corporations, but both extend the guaranty
use to any other state or governmental obligations. Michigan expressly
validates the corporate guaranty of the obligations of other corporations,
banking corporations or trust companies. ' Kansas" and West Virginia"
limit the corporate guaranty to only the obligations of other corporations.
Conversely, Ohio limits the guaranty only to the obligations of any "per-
sons.'. 4 Rhode Island provides the power to guarantee the obligations on
"a certain amount per share in liquidation of the capital stock of any other
corporation."" Arkansas specifically empowers corporate guaranties "to
"3WIs. STAT. § 180.04(7) (Supp. 1969).
114Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.4(h) (1965).
115 Other states have adopted the MBCA § 4(h) provision, but because of other statutory
provisions which effectively mitigate the extensive grant of power, they are mentioned in other
subsections infra. See text accompanying notes 140, 149 infra.
...CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. 5 33-291(e)(3) (1961).
". DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 122(13) (Supp. 1968).
"
8 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-202(a)(11) (Supp. 1969).
"ON.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 294:4(VI) (1966). See also Opinion of the Justices, 169 A.2d
279 (N.H. 1961).
"°PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 1302(6) (Supp. 1969).
"' S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-12.2(a)(11) (Supp. 1968).
"'TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-403 (Supp. 1964).
" IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-114(2)(d) (1967).
"2
4
LA. REV. STAT. § 12:41B(6) (1969).
125OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.19 (1953).
126VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3(g) (Supp. 1968).
127 Id.
28 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 141 (1965), was recently amended by adding the following
to the end of the statute: "A Corporation, unless its certificate of organization or bylaws specifically
provide otherwise, may by vote of its board of directors guarantee without charge or payment
the obligations of another corporation, firm or individual." Me. Leg. Serv., ch. 227, H.P. 592-L.D.
773 (1969).
"'FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.13(9a) (1956).
130 NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.070 (1967).
'21 MIcH. COMP. LAWS S 450.10(i) (1967).
1asKAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3001E (1964).
13W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-65 (1966).
"' OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (F)(6) (1964). Id. § 1701.01 (G) defines "persons" as
including, without limitation, a corporation (whether nonprofit or for profit), a partnership, an
unincorporated society or association, and two or more persons having a joint or common interest.
a' R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. S 7-2-10(i) (1957).
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customers, suppliers and employees, where, in the opinion of the directors
such action should be taken to promote good employer-employee relation-
ships." '' North Carolina permits a corporation to enter into contracts of
guaranty for the benefit of any person," ' firm or corporation.
"Benefit" or "Corporate Purpose" Requirements. Delaware authorizes
financial assistance via guaranties by the parent corporation to officers and
employees of the parent or subsidiary "whenever, in the judgment of the
directors, such . . . guaranty . . . may reasonably be expected to benefit
the corporation."... Nebraska, in addition to an MBCA section 4 (h) pro-
vision, authorizes a guaranty of the obligations of "others" for the guaran-
tor's "corporate purposes..... Colorado likewise validates the guaranty
upon the obligations of "others" for its corporate purposes.14' Massachusetts
empowers the corporation to "give guaranties" in furtherance of its cor-
porate purposes.' Minnesota permits the corporate guaranty, where not
authorized in the articles of incorporation, upon the obligations of other
corporations when "reasonably necessary or incidental to accomplish the
purposes stated in its articles."''
Voting Requirements. California denies a corporation the power to guar-
antee the obligations of (1) any directors or officers of the corporation,
its holding corporations or any of its subsidiary corporations, directly or
indirectly, or (2) any person, upon the security of the shares of the cor-
poration, its holding corporation or subsidiary corporations, except by
vote or written consent of the non-benefitted holders of two-thirds of
the shares of all classes. 4 ' Colorado provides that upon the affirmative vote
of the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of the cor-
poration which are entitled to vote for directors, the corporation can guar-
antee the obligations of its directors and officers." Montana's counterpart
to Colorado's statute requires only a majority vote. " ' New York provides
that a guaranty not in furtherance of a corporate purpose must be author-
ized at a meeting of shareholders"4 by the holders of two-thirds of all
outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon.' New Jersey adopted the
6 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-104B(3) (1966).
... Subject to the provisions accompanying note 151 infra.
"
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17(b) (3) (Supp. 1965).
"
9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (Supp. 1968).
'
4 0 NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(8), (9) (Supp. 1968).
.
41 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-1(9) (1964).
... MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 156B, § 9(h) (Supp. 1968). See also Casey, The New Business
Corporation Law, 50 MAss. L.Q. 201, 202 (1965).
"
4 5MINN. STAT. § 301.10 (1969).
144CAL. CORP. CODE § 823(a) (West 1955). Comments to CAL. CORP. CODE § 823 (West
1968) indicate the drafter's intent to remove any doubt that a corporation may guarantee the loan
of an affiliate.
14 5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 31-2-1 (6) (1964).
141MONT. RE'. CODES ANN. 5 15-2204(f) (1967).
"" The "meeting" requirement becomes more stringent as the number of shareholders increases,
but can probably be handled with proxy voting.
""N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 908 (McKinney 1963). See also Commercial Trading Co. v. 120
Jane Corp., 27 App. Div. 533, 275 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1966); Particular Problems Under the New
York Business Corporation Law, 11 BUFFALO L. REV. 615, 646 (1962).
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MBCA section 4(h) provision and, through a slight twist of the New
York provision, required that a corporation could give a guaranty not in
furtherance of its corporate purposes only when authorized by affirmative
vote of two-thirds of the votes cast by the holders of each class and series
of shares entitled to vote.14 ' Tennessee provides the corporate guaranty
of the obligations of any other entity by vote of a majority of the entire
board of directors, unless such power is reserved to the shareholders in
the charter.1 ' North Carolina requires the consent of the holders of a
majority of all the "disinterested" shares outstanding before the corpora-
tion can guarantee the obligations of (1) any directors or officers of the
corporation, (2) any corporation of which the officers and directors of
the lending or securing corporation own more than fifty per cent of the
outstanding securities of any class, or (3) any dominant shareholder or
any other corporation of which the shareholder is a dominant shareholder,
unless that corporation is a subsidiary of the lending or securing corpora-
tion. 1'
Suggested Texas Amendment. States adopting the MBCA section 4 (h)
provision but further defining the guaranty's scope indicate the uncertainty
of the boundaries of utilizing the MBCA guaranty power."2 Hence, mere
legislative adoption of a statement that "each corporation shall have power
to make guaranties" will neither expunge resort to the "direct benefit"
test nor the corporate managers' dilemma. Rejection of the simplistic
approach constrains the acceptance of more cumbersome verbiage in at-
tempting to formulate an amendment to TBCA article 2.02.1 By selecting
the most advantageous provisions from the foregoing statutory potpourri,
and by repealing article 1302-2.06,"' the following amendment to the
Texas Business Corporation Act is tendered:
Art. 2.02-1. Guaranties.
A. Each corporation shall have (subject to Section B below) power to make
guaranties respecting contracts, securities and other obligations of any person
(including, but not limited to any domestic or foreign corporation, partner-
ship, association, joint venture, trust or individual),"' any government, state,
territory, government district, or municipality, or any instrumentality
14 N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 14A:3-1(1)(g), 14A:3-3 (1969): "The section will prove useful, in
the opinion of the Commission, where the transaction is entered into in good faith and with the
thought of indirect or long-run corporate benefit but where there is also doubt as to whether the
transaction would be adjudicated to be not in furtherance of the corporate purposes."
5 50 TENN. CODE ANN. S 48-403 (Supp. 1964).
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. S 55-22 (Supp. 1965).
11Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, and New Jersey are states in which additional expletives were
added to the MBCA provision. Compare MONT. REV. CooEs ANN. §§ 15-2004, 15-2204(f) (1967),
where the scope of the guaranty was not altered, but rather the voting requirement for using it,
with NEB. REV. STAT. 5 21-2004(8), (9) (Supp. 1968), wherein the MBCA grant was limited
for the guarantor's corporate purposes.
.
1
TEX. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 2.02 (1956).
11 4 TEX. REv. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06 (Supp. 1968). Since most of the situations calling
for a corporate guaranty involve the parent-subsidiary relationship where the parent owns less than
100% of the subsidiary, the present 1007 ownership requirement must be eliminated in order to
establish an effective guaranty statute.
... Subject to the (B) provisions, employees, customers, suppliers and others with whom the
corporation transacts business are included.
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thereof," e if such guaranties may reasonably be expected to benefit, directly
or indirectly,5 ' the guarantor corporation. In the absence of fraud, the de-
cision of a majority of the board of directors not deriving any personal
benefit from the guaranty, within the meaning of Section B of this Article,
that the guaranty may reasonably be expected to benefit, directly or indirectly,
the guarantor corporation shall be conclusive.
B. Each corporation shall have power to make guaranties conferring a personal
benefit upon any of its officers or directors or any holder (including but not
limited to any domestic or foreign corporation, partnership, association, joint
venture, trust, or individual) of ten (10) per cent or more of any class or
series of the corporation's outstanding shares only if authorized by an affirma-
tive vote of two-thirds"u of all shares of each class entitled to vote thereon.
A guaranty shall be deemed to confer a personal benefit upon such a person,
if it is a guaranty of the contracts, securities, or other obligations (a) of that
person or (b) of another person in whom that person has a financial interest
of ten (10) per cent or more as a shareholder of any class or series of shares,
partner, member, venturer, beneficiary or otherwise, or (c) of another person
with which that person has the position of officer, director, general partner,
or similar relationship.
IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional protective attitude of the legislature that shareholders'
investments should not be exposed to uncontrolled risks by corporate man-
agers will be an important factor in the future success of guaranty pro-
posals. From the standpoint of business realities the corporate guarantor's
risk should be viewed not as uncontrolled, but rather as calculated. Like-
wise, the anachronistic rule perpetuated in Texas that the guaranty is not
within the ordinary scope of a corporation's business has been fostered
under a misapprehension of the nature of a guaranty contract. A guaranty
is not "corporate business" in a general sense of the expression, but rather
takes its color entirely from the business transaction of which it happens
to be a part.
Legislative action is required to ameliorate the guaranty's use in Texas.
The corporate manager is presently empowered to utilize absolute instru-
ments in leasing and dealing with personal property, ' assisting em-
ployees, ' and in making contracts and incurring liabilities.' But the cor-
15' The governmental segment here is consistent with that in TEx. Bus. CoP'. ACT ANN. art.
2.02A(7) (1956).
... Without having to explain the demarcation between a "direct" and "indirect" benefit, the
dilemma of corporate managers vanishes.
... The two-thirds voting requirement is consistent with the other voting requirements within
the TBCA. However, there is some question of the advisability of allowing corporate guaranties to
directors and officers since the corporation can't make loans to such individuals. TEx. Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. art. 2.41 (4) (1956) states "The directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to the
making of a loan to an officer or director of the corporation, or the making of any loan secured
by shares of the corporation, shall be jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the amount
of such loan until the repayment thereof." However, in Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397
S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965), it was made clear that a loan to an officer or director by the corporation
was simply ultra vires and not illegal. Thus, regarding the proposed statute, corporate managers,
in order to be fully protected from liability, should obtain 100% ratification of the guaranty
transaction by the shareholders. Of course, the 100% voting requirement is available to the legis-
lators, in lieu of the two-thirds provision, should they desire no future uncertainty.
"" TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02A(4) (1956).
' 6d. art. 2.02A(6).
161 Id. art. 2.02A(9).
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porate manager is pinched by a seventy-five-year-old restriction... upon
his authorization of a guaranty. It would seem that there is a contradic-
tion in extending approval to the corporate manager's execution of an
absolute instrument of indebtedness when his authorization of a conditional
credit device is abnegated.
1
6 North Side Ry. v. Worthington, 88 Tex. 562, 30 S.W. 1055 (1895). See text accompanying
note 51 supra.
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